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In this essay I will argue that Brexit – the vote for Britain to leave the European Union – has 
enacted a fundamental shift in British politics and society which poses significant challenges 
for Critical Management Studies (CMS) in Britain, and possibly even marks its death knell. It 
is intended as a provocation to debate and as such many will strongly disagree, or at least 
feel uncomfortable, with it. Perhaps that disagreement will, even, be a springboard for CMS 
academics and activists to respond to Brexit in ways I have not anticipated and thereby 
prove me wrong in my diagnosis. 
I want to begin this analysis by clarifying its terms and purposes, both in the sense of what I 
am trying to talk about and what I am not trying to talk about. First, I am talking about CMS, 
but of course in doing so that begs the question of what CMS is, something which has been 
persistently agonised over (e.g. Sotirin & Tyrell, 1998; Fournier & Grey, 2000) almost since it 
emerged as a term. If there is a consensus view it is that it is a “composite beset by internal 
strains and tensions, not a unified movement” (Grey & Willmott, 20012: 411) with a 
“sprawling as well as open, ill-defined nature” (Willmott, 2013: 138) making it “difficult or 
even inappropriate to definitively ‘label’ CMS” (Murphy et al., 2013: xiv) which alerts us to 
the fact that this it cannot be spoken of in a homogenous way. Still, there is a large body of 
literature which explicitly adopts the CMS label, along with conferences, handbooks and so 
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on, and although this is very far from homogenous it’s still meaningful to talk about CMS in 
a general way, just as one might for any other academic orientation.  
But more specifically I want to talk about CMS not as an academic literature but as a project 
entailing a general “leftist political orientation” (Grey, 2005: 175) which, if not envisageable 
as a political “party” then at least constituting a political “big tent” (Parker, 2013: 171) which 
might be regarded as a kind of social movement (Willmott, 2013). Paul Adler (2002) 
envisages this politics as being, at the most generic level “progressive” and, more precisely, 
based on “labor, feminist, anti-racist, ecological and other perspectives” (2002: 387) but not 
tied to any particular theoretical perspective.  
I plainly don’t, and couldn’t, mean by that that CMS as a body of literature or as a collection 
of individuals who may produce, read or identify with that literature all share a common set 
of political views. Nor do I mean to imply that CMS has articulated a position as regards 
Brexit specifically, or even that it has ever much interested itself in or been engaged with 
the EU as a political institution. Instead I mean (and will discuss later) that CMS has, again in 
general, a particular kind of liberal-left orientation which is critical of neo-liberal 
globalization, managerialism, consumerism, inequality and elites, and corporate domination 
whilst being sympathetic to feminism, environmentalism, post-colonialism, gay rights, anti-
racism, labour and liberation movements. And although any generalization of this kind can 
be questioned, what I think is unquestionable is that there is no existing statement of the 
politics of CMS that endorses, let alone makes central, the nationalist politics of the Brexit 
campaign (whether that nationalism took the form of anti-immigration sentiment or of the 
more abstract notion of national sovereignty embedded in the core Brexit slogan of ‘taking 
back control’). 
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The second opening clarification is that I am talking specifically and solely about CMS in 
Britain. CMS exists in various forms in many other countries (see Grey et al., 2016) and I 
doubt that Brexit will, in itself, have any significant impact on it in those countries. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the origins of CMS are associated quite closely with Britain 
(Parker, 2016: 196-97), and that it is here that it has arguably been most strongly 
established, what happens here may have wider implications. Third, I am not seeking to 
provide an analysis of Brexit in general and its implications for either Britain or the EU; or 
even of its wider implications for management and organization studies, or for 
organizations. So I’m not saying anything particularly ‘new’ about Brexit – about which 
trillions of words have and will be written: I am solely concerned with what the politics of 
Brexit might mean for CMS in Britain. 
Britain was viscerally and bitterly divided (O’Reilly, 2016) by the EU Referendum campaign 
and, now, by its consequences, and Brexit swamps just about every other political issue 
both at the present time and, most likely, for several years to come. It revealed divisions 
between social classes, cities and regions, generations, and even split families; moreover, 
these divisions cut right across the lines of the main political parties. This certainly does not 
mean that Brexit came from nowhere and that the divisions it exposed were not already 
manifest in various ways. But what the vote did was to crystallise those divisions in the most 
visible of ways and not as a one off event in 2016, because the scale of what Brexit involves 
economically, culturally and politically means that for the foreseeable future just about 
every public policy issue will be framed by it. Hence the ‘leavers’ versus ‘remainers’ (and 
within that different shades of what ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ mean) distinction in turn frames 
the terms of political participation. Such a highly polarised landscape inevitably impacts 
upon CMS as it does for upon every other part of British politics and society. 
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My argument is, first, that in the Referendum vote CMS, understood as the political project 
identified above, found itself on the same, anti-Brexit, side as big business and mainstream 
management studies (MMS), making it hard to sustain itself as something separate from 
these. Second, I argue that this reflects a wider set of issues about the liberal-left and the EU 
which, third, means that CMS now finds itself located within what is regarded by the pro-
Brexit side as ‘the establishment elite’, and that to work effectively against Brexit British 
CMS will need to work as part of that establishment elite. My conclusion is that this may 
mark the end of British CMS as it has hitherto existed. 
CMS and the Brexit vote 
One way of approaching the implications of Brexit for CMS in Britain is this. The question of 
EU membership was a binary question of ‘in or out’ that admitted of no ambiguity: you were 
on one side or the other. Within that binary CMS academics and MMS academics – and, for 
that matter, those management academics who don’t, or don’t consider themselves, to fit 
under either of those labels - were likely to have been on the same side.  
Of course I don’t know how individuals voted – and to make the point again, I am not 
claiming that every CMS academic voted to remain - but several opinion polls show a strong 
correlation between higher levels of education and propensity to vote to remain: 64% of 
those people with a higher degree who voted, voted to remain (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016). 
One, admittedly self-selecting, survey showed an astounding 90% level of support for 
remain amongst, specifically, university staff (Times Higher Education, 2016). This was 
reflected in the way that cities with major universities (e.g. Cambridge, Oxford, Bristol) 
voted to remain. So it seems highly likely that the majority of staff in management and 
business schools, whether CMS oriented or not, voted remain. For what it is worth (and no 
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more), that is certainly consistent with my own sense from numerous conversations with 
such people. 
Not only did Brexit put CMS and MMS academics on the same side, it also put CMS on the 
same side as the vast majority of big business and financial capital, whose leaders and 
representative bodies were virtually unanimous in their desire to remain within the EU (as 
were most leaders and representative bodies of universities and business schools). If that 
seems an uncomfortable and ironic positioning to critical academics, then it would not seem 
so to many Brexiters. The leitmotif of the populist Brexit campaign and result was that it was 
an anti-elitist rebellion, and the elite referred to consists quite as much, and perhaps more, 
of the intellectual elite as it does of the corporate elite. Indeed, both are subsumed, and 
disdained, under the label of the ‘liberal elite’. 
There is a need for considerable scepticism about this, of course. The leave campaign was 
fronted almost entirely by figures who by normal reckonings would be considered part of 
the elite in terms of educational and class background, and, in most cases were both socially 
liberal, economically liberal or both. Examples include the de facto leader of the official 
Leave Campaign, Boris Johnson, educated at Eton and Oxford. This leads to many 
complexities and ironies for what Brexit will mean, which I will discuss later. 
But even if we are sceptical about the non-elite credentials of its leaders, the leave vote is 
widely interpreted as having been driven to some large degree by the wrath of those ‘left 
behind’ by globalization, especially as regards employment and conditions of employment 
(Warhurst, 2016). Paralleling Trump’s core vote in rust belt America, the archetype of the 
Brexit voter is someone from the white working class, living in England but outside of 
Greater London and most big cities, in regions which have been substantially de-
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industrialized over several decades1. Indeed this has become pretty much the standard 
diagnosis of Brexit, and of nationalist populism more generally (e.g. Hochschild, 2016; 
Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
The evidence of the voting patterns bears this out to a considerable extent. It was in those 
regions of England that the leave vote was strongest, and it was amongst the lower social 
classes, lowest education, lowest employment rate and lowest income groups that the leave 
vote was strongest; and amongst those who thought that globalization was ‘a force for ill’, 
69% voted to leave (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016). However, it should not be ignored that there 
were plenty of more prosperous, middle-class people and areas that voted to leave. 
Moreover, statistics about the income, employment and educational levels of leavers are to 
an extent skewed by the fact that age was also closely correlated with voting to leave. Thus 
retired voters will also show up as economically inactive, on lower incomes (i.e. pensions) 
and, because they pre-dated the large-scale expansion of post-compulsory and higher 
education, as less educated. 
So there are caveats to be made to the broad picture, but it still remains the case that the 
vote opened up a large chasm based on social class and education, and within that chasm 
CMS academics (like academics in general) are likely to have been on the remain side and 
therefore stand in opposition to largely working-class voters2. But this is not just about 
economic marginalization. The vote also showed a profound division on social and political 
issues. Specifically, the populism associated with Brexit is explicable not just in terms of the 
                                                          
1 It is tempting to add ‘male’ to this archetype, as much of the anger of populist politics seems to come from 
men. But the polling evidence suggests that gender was not a factor in the Brexit vote. It is also, of course, 
precisely an ‘archetype’: I don’t mean that only voters of this type voted for Brexit (or Trump). 
2 Social class, as defined in the polling evidence, refers to occupation rather than origin or identification. Thus 
in this sense academics are by definition in social classes AB which voted 57-43 remain by contrast with 36-64 
in social classes C2DE (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016) 
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economic insecurity associated with economic liberalism but also as part of a ‘cultural 
backlash’ against social liberalism (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2009) found 
even amongst those who do not suffer as a result of economic liberalism and may even 
benefit from it. 
Thus the referendum vote showed that around 80% of people who thought that multi-
culturalism, social liberalism, the green movement and immigration were ‘forces for ill’ 
voted to leave the EU, as did about 74% of people who thought feminism was a force for ill. 
The situation was more or less reversed amongst those who voted to remain. It is not a 
great leap of the imagination to see where CMS academics are likely to have been located 
on such issues. But the issue here is only partly about how CMS academics are likely to have 
voted as individuals. The more important point is that the political project of CMS itself is at 
odds with the underlying politics of the Brexit vote as evidenced by its strong associations 
with social illiberalism. If writers like Adler (2002) and Parker (2002; 2013) are right then 
CMS politics encompasses the feminism, environmentalism, anti-racism, anti-imperialism 
and so on, hostility to which associates with the Brexit vote. Moreover, CMS politics may 
also be anti-capitalist politics but – and it is an important but - the Brexit vote did not 
associate with seeing ‘capitalism’ as a force for good or ill: on this, both remainers and 
leavers split about 50/50. (All figures from Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016). 
CMS, the EU and the Liberal-Left 
To the extent that the Brexit can indeed be understood as a response to neo-liberal 
globalization by its discontents and victims – and with the caveats I have made, this can’t be 
ignored as one important part of the explanation – and to the extent that CMS academics 
were opposed to Brexit it poses an obvious problem for CMS. Parker’s (2013: 177) evocation 
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of the CMS political big tent depicts it as being “in sympathy with a wide range of critiques 
of capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism ... which might include … anti-capitalist protestors, 
shareholder activists, trade unionists, environmental campaigners, ethical investors and 
those who care about slow food, local money …”. So if CMS has this anti-neo-liberal 
globalization, pro-localism politics, how come it is on the ‘wrong side’ of Brexit? 
This question is not unique to CMS, of course. In various ways they exist for the wider British 
liberal-left of which CMS is to some degree a species. There has long been a Left critique of 
the EU for precisely the reason that it can be seen as an aspect of neo-liberal globalization. 
In the 1970s when Britain joined (what became) the EU most of the opposition to doing so 
did indeed come from the Left on the basis that it was a ‘capitalist club’. This was the view 
of Tony Benn, then the leading figure of the British Left, and of Jeremy Corbyn who by the 
time of the 2017 Referendum was the leader of the Labour Party. Corbyn did campaign 
against Brexit, but was widely seen as having done so half-heartedly and at the time of 
writing endorses not just Brexit but ‘hard Brexit’ (meaning exit not just from the EU but 
from the European single market). Others on the Left (such as the Rail, Transport and 
Maritime Union) explicitly endorsed ‘Lexit’ (Left Brexit) during the Referendum exactly for 
the reason that Benn had opposed EU membership in the 1970s. 
However, many other parts of the British Left had long ago come to the view that the EU 
offered the best way of controlling the neo-liberal ascendancy within the UK, so strong since 
1980s Thatcherism, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. More 
generally, from this perspective the EU could be seen as a tentative step towards if not 
global then at least regional regulation of capital. Freedom of movement for labour was a 
particularly important aspect of this, because it at least gave labour some of the rights of 
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international mobility that would otherwise be restricted to capital and in any case sat well 
with the traditional internationalism of many parts of the liberal-left. That, of course, was a 
significant fault-line in the Brexit debate since this unrestricted immigration for EU citizens 
was a major argument made for leaving. It is for this reason that, again at the time of 
writing, the British Labour Party remains split between those, including its leadership, who 
support hard Brexit and those who wish to see either a soft Brexit (remaining within the 
European single market) or no Brexit at all. 
What this adds up to, then, is that for CMS as for many on the liberal-left, working class 
voters were asking the right question but gave the ‘wrong answer’. If emancipation from 
oppression and opposition to neo-liberal globalization (exemplified by the financial crisis) 
are the hallmarks of CMS then the working class has decided to emancipate itself by 
embracing nativism (often with a racist element), populism, nationalism and illiberalism. 
That wasn’t the answer that CMS would give, not least since it is likely to be highly self-
defeating for those ‘left behind by globalization’ because for reasons I will expand upon 
shortly they are likely to be the biggest losers from Brexit. 
Such prognostications are unlikely to cut much ice with leave voters, though. They are just a 
species of the ‘Project Fear’ rhetoric found in the mouths of Conservative politicians and, 
again, the elite. There are only very limited signs (at the time of writing: October 2017) of 
any regret on the part of leave voters, and very little evidence that they would acquiesce to 
the idea that they gave the ‘wrong answer’. Instead, there is a strong sense of having ‘put 
two fingers up’ at the massed ranks of the elite, the establishment and the ‘experts’ – a 
grouping that includes ‘us’, CMS academics. In the now highly polarised politics of Brexit 
Britain there is therefore a strong temptation for us to return the gesture. Unless we are to 
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fall back on that old Marxist trope of ‘false consciousness’ we end up saying: you made the 
choice, you gave the wrong answer, so you will have to suffer the consequences. 
Alternatively, we end up saying, patronizingly, that we understand the frustrations and 
sufferings that gave rise to that choice, as if placating a child’s tantrum. Either way, in the 
form that anti-globalization sentiment has most powerfully and effectively articulated itself, 
CMS is not on the side of that sentiment. 
CMS and the politics of post-referendum Britain 
CMS in Britain cannot be understood in isolation from politics in general and the politics of 
neo-liberalism in particular. Fournier & Grey (2000: 10-11) explain the emergence of UK 
CMS in part in terms of the terrain of the 1980s Thatcherite New Right and the subsequent 
embrace of neo-liberalism by the New Labour party in the 1990s and 2000s. But New Labour 
added a particular dimension of technocratic managerialism, so that the nexus of what 
Parker (2002) called ‘market-managerialism’ became the target of critique for CMS. 
The wider framing of the Thatcherite and New Labour rapprochement (Heffernan, 2001) 
was the supposed ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Now, not just capitalism but the turbocharged ‘new capitalism’ (Sennett, 2006) of 
globalizing neo-liberalism was the only game in town and, as New Labour’s guru sociologist 
had it, we had moved ‘beyond left and right’ (Giddens, 1994) into a post-ideological politics. 
Hence much CMS was concerned to show how technocratic managerialism was, in fact, 
deeply ideological; and to line up with the critics, both in the academy and on the street, of 
globalization. If the dominant narrative was there is no alternative (TINA) to the market, 
CMS was one of the voices protesting that alternatives did indeed exist. 
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Much of this now seems very dated. Whilst managerialism cannot be said to have 
disappeared, the New Labour era of ‘what matters is what works’ in policy-making is a 
distant memory. And, more to the present point, the anti-globalization movement that has 
proved successful is not Occupy and the like but the nationalism, nativism and (supposed, 
though unlikely to be realised) economic protectionism of Brexit and Trump. Ideology is 
back with a vengeance but, again, it’s the wrong sort of ideology from a CMS perspective. 
TINA is out of fashion, but the alternative coming into fashion isn’t anything like what CMS 
envisaged. In short, the ground in which CMS grew in the UK has shifted, if not disappeared. 
The complexity in this lies in the way that, despite the support of nativist voters, Brexit is 
being enacted as a new and intensified form of globalization. Precisely because the leave 
leaders were almost entirely free market globalists, and with Brexit policy firmly driven from 
the Thatcherite hard Right of the Conservative Party, what is envisioned is a ‘buccaneering’ 
Britain ‘re-discovering’ its global trade role. Thus Liam Fox, a leading Brexit campaigner 
appointed to the government after the referendum result, declared: 
“I believe the UK is in a prime position to become a world leader in free trade because of 
the brave and historic decision of the British people to leave the European Union” (Fox, 
2016) 
Freed from the constraints of the EU, these globalist Brexiters argue, Britain can sign trade 
deals around the world and also get rid of all the supposedly European bureaucratic red 
tape which in practice seems to mean labour rights and environmental standards. At the 
least, the desperation to sign trade deals on any terms after Brexit is likely to diminish these 
rights and standards and possibly lead to further privatization of the NHS in particular. 
Meanwhile, declining tax receipts are likely to fuel public service cuts and it is not even clear 
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that immigration levels will fall (and if they do this is likely to have adverse consequences for 
the economy and public services). At the extreme, it is conceivable that the UK will become 
a low-wage, low regulation tax haven; the ‘European Singapore’ favoured by some leading 
Brexiters.  
CMS, one must assume from all the ways it has been discussed, would be hostile to such a 
politics, which means that it must also be hostile to Brexit (even a CMS ‘Lexiter’ will be 
hostile to this hard Right Brexit). But because the Tory Brexit vision is so profoundly 
unrealistic it is equally opposed by the bulk of big business and finance – not, presumably, 
because of a lament for labour rights and environmental standards but because it is 
completely out of kilter with the way that the British economy actually works. For example, 
businesses benefit from free movement of people and also from the removal of non-tariff 
barriers to trade which is the defining and, for businesses, superior feature of the European 
single market as opposed to any other form of free trade agreement or area.  
So not just in their stance to the Referendum vote but also because the post-vote 
developments lead them, albeit for different reasons, to continue to be anti-Brexit, CMS, big 
business and for that matter MMS will continue to be in the same camp. But as well as now 
being aligned with big business CMS is also part of the elite, in the way that Brexit populists 
view it, because of the kind of politics it espouses. CMS, in the main, has not been labourist 
in orientation but, rather, has affiliated to a wider politics of difference encompassing, as 
Fournier & Grey (2000: 27) put it, “feminists, gay and lesbian movements, black activists” as 
well as environmentalism, post-colonialism and the anti-patriarchy, anti-racist and anti-
imperialist stances referred to by Parker (2013: 17) and Adler (2002: 387), as quoted earlier. 
In British CMS that has been perhaps particularly true to the extent that it arose to some 
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large degree from an antagonistic split with Labour Process Analysis, with its more Marxist 
and labourist commitments.  
Again this mirrors wider development in the politics of the liberal-left, a politics which, 
according to Hochschild (2016) and others has by embodying an ‘identity politics’ 
fundamentally alienated the ‘white working class’ (WWC) whom it seems to put at the back 
of the queue. There’s an obvious irony here in the way that this victimhood narrative of the 
WWC is itself a form of identity politics (Goodfellow, 2016) and is promulgated most 
assiduously by those who have turned their backs on labourism. But in any case, it is not just 
about the WWC. The politics of CMS is equally alienating to sections of the middle class who 
perceive ‘political correctness to have gone mad’. In other words, CMS embodies that social 
liberalism to which the ‘cultural backlash’ of Brexit populism is in part a response as well as 
now aligning with big business. Which might be another way of saying that the lazy sneer of 
Brexiters about an elite in which they lump together socially liberal intellectuals and 
corporate fat cats turns out, rather annoyingly, to be true3. Perhaps Brexit has served to 
make plainly visible the way that the very success of CMS in the UK has made “what once 
seemed ‘outsider’ into something rather insider … taking on the values associated with the 
centres of power” (Parker, 2016: 200). 
Conclusion 
The Referendum result was ostensibly a vote against British membership of the EU. But it 
coded a whole range of other things, including a vote against economic and cultural 
                                                          
3 There’s obviously something inherently absurd in the idea that those who voted remain constitute an elite, 
since 48% of those who voted did so. But Brexiters aren’t by and large referring to all the voters but to the 
educated, the expert, those who are to some degree in positions of authority. Which, like it or not, includes 
CMS academics. 
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globalization, social liberalism, and the liberal elite. In this sense, it can be regarded as a 
vote against many of the things that CMS stands for. Even where there might be common 
ground – opposition to neo-liberal globalization – the form that this took in Brexit was not 
that of CMS, and the opposition to social liberalism is an outright rejection of CMS politics. 
Because Brexit has polarised British politics into two sides there is no place for a middle 
ground (at least not amongst those who are politically engaged)4. CMS, like it or not, is in 
the same camp as business, MMS and the socially liberal elite. It might be objected that it is 
not necessary for CMS to diverge from all aspects of MMS and business in order to retain its 
critical identity. But that is to overlook the fundamental binary divide of Brexit as the 
defining meta-issue of British politics. Similarly, it might, as one anonymous reviewer of this 
paper suggested, be objected CMS is also in the same camp as academics in physics, 
antiquity scholars or any other disciplines and so being also with MMS is neither here nor 
there. But, of course, CMS doesn’t define itself in contrast to all those disciplines; it does so 
in contrast to MMS, its “Big Other” as (Parker 2002: 120) puts it. That can’t be sustained if 
on the biggest and most divisive issue for many decades CMS and its other are 
indistinguishable. 
I think this means that CMS in the UK is now in a significantly different political terrain to 
that which obtained since it emerged in the 1990s, and this makes it unclear how it can 
operate. One position would be to align with those who continue to seek ‘Lexit’, but that 
means working in isolation from the most powerful parts of the emergent anti-Brexit 
coalition5. These include many business leaders, university leaders, journalists, think tanks, 
                                                          
4 It’s not my focus here, but it’s worth saying that is not just CMS and the liberal-left whose politics have been 
redefined by Brexit. Consider the position of the (many) pro-EU Conservatives who now belong to a party 
which is pursuing a policy at odds with the vast majority of its traditional support base in business and finance. 
5 A piece such as this is always liable to date – rapidly, given the unpredictable politics of Brexit. It is therefore 
possible that a Labour government will form and pursue Lexit. That changes the dynamics of Brexit and what it 
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reputedly most senior civil servants, conservative politicians such as former Prime Minister 
John Major and Ken Clarke and New Labour figures such as Peter Mandelson and Tony Blair. 
Thus to work effectively against Brexit CMS must make common cause with many of the 
erstwhile targets of its critique; to become, in this sense, a part of ‘the Establishment’. And 
it is important to bear in mind that (on the basis of the polling evidence quoted earlier) 
Brexit was not a vote against capitalism per se in the way that it was against globalization 
and social liberalism. In any case, what such a ‘Lexit’ position is predicated on is the 
possibility of there not being two sides but a variety of positions. 
That possibility may have some purchase. The binary polarization of the referendum may 
soften in time. In particular, it is possible that the fissures on the Brexit side between its 
globalist and economically liberal leaders and the nationalism and protectionism of many of 
its supporters will fracture that side of the argument. That then also makes it easier for a 
range of anti-Brexit positions to be articulated. It certainly seems reasonable to think that as 
the process of leaving the EU unfolds the consequences are highly unpredictable, so precise 
predictions are probably foolish. 
Even so, at the moment I think the grounds for optimism are slim. No doubt there will 
continue to be a place for critical papers about managerialism, handbooks, conferences, and 
so on. And no doubt there are many individuals who affiliate with CMS for whom Brexit is 
unproblematic or indeed irrelevant (to repeat, it is not my argument and it is not necessary 
to my argument that all CMS academics are opposed to Brexit). But understood in terms of 
its broad political project the omens for British CMS are not good. CMS has always stood in 
                                                          
means for CMS, but in complex ways given that, at present, Labour is drawing electoral support from both 
nativist Brexiters in some of its traditional heartlands and younger, urban remainers. Thus the same basic 
binary sides will persist, albeit in a different context to that of a Conservative government. Moreover, even is 
Brexit is somehow abandoned altogether, the scars and divisions will endure. 
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some way – complex, qualified, contested and varied, no doubt – for a politics that favours 
the marginalised, the oppressed, and the powerless against the privilege and power of the 
elite (Adler, 2002; Murphy et al, 2013; Parker, 2013). Unfortunately, the marginalised, 
oppressed and powerless have in large numbers voted against much that CMS believes in 
and positioned CMS as part of a privileged and powerful elite establishment which they 
despise: perhaps that was always so, but Brexit makes it explicit and unavoidable. If CMS is 
to work effectively as part of an anti-Brexit coalition it will have to work as part of that elite 
establishment, which inevitably involves compromising and diluting its criticality. It may be 
that British CMS academics and activists will find new and creative ways to articulate CMS in 
the post-Brexit landscape that I am unable to see. I hope so. But I suspect that in retrospect 
CMS in Britain will be remembered, if at all, as a curious artefact of a period bookended by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the populist wave of 2016. 
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